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RECENT DECISIONS 
CIVIL PROCEDURE-VENUE-EFFECT OF CONTRAC'l' PROVISION FIXING 
VENUE AS To FUTURE LITIGATION-Defendants, residents of Harris County, 
Texas, executed in Harris County a conditional sale contract to purchase a 
food freezer from plaintiff's assignor. One of the contract provisions was 
that any suit on the contract was to be tried in Travis County, Texas.1 Plain-
tiff subsequently brought an action on the contract in Travis County, and 
defendants, contrary to their agreement, requested the trial court to 
transfer the action to a court of proper jurisdiction in Harris County, which 
was the proper county for suit under the applicable venue statute.2 In 
response, plaintiff argued that, since the contract created an obligation 
performable in Travis County, the contract came within a statutory ex-
ception to the general venue rule and Travis County was the proper 
county in which to bring the suit.8 The trial court denied defendants' 
motion and upheld the contract provision. On appeal, held, reversed.-' 
The contract provision specifying that any action brought on the contract 
is to be brought in Travis County is contrary to public policy and con-
sequently void.11 Tilley v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 367 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1963). 
The holding of the court in the principal case adheres to the general 
rule followed by the majority of American courts regarding contracts which 
attempt to fix venue before the cause of action has accrued.6 However, the 
1 The provision in relevant part stated: "Any suit brought on the Contract of Sale 
shall be brought in Travis County, Texas." Principal case at 361. Apparently the seller, 
who was located in Houston, Harris County, Texas, regularly assigned its conditional 
sale contracts to plaintiff, the Capital National Bank, in Austin, Travis County, Texas. 
Ibid. 
2 "No person who is an inhabitant of this State shall be sued out of the county in 
which he has his domicile except •.. if a person has contracted in writing to perform an 
obligation in a particular county, expressly naming such county, or a definite place 
therein, by such writing, suit upon or by reason of such obligation may be brought against 
him, either in such county or where the defendant has his domicile." TEX. REv. CIV. 
STAT. ANN. art. 1995(5) (1950). 
3 Ibid. However, the court held that the obligation involved was the obligation to pay, 
which was not, under the contract, performable in Travis County. Principal case at 362; 
cf. Mccurdy v. King, 359 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Atkins v. Wheeler, 307 S.W.2d 
294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hunsaker, 50 S.W .2d 367 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932). 
4 The court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to transfer the 
action to a court of proper jurisdiction in Harris County. Principal case at 362. 
5 Furthermore, the court held that the contract provision did not come within the 
statutory exception. Id. at 362. 
6 See, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Codiga, 62 Cal. App. 117, 216 Pac. 383 
(1923); Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174 (1856); Gardner & North 
Roofing & Siding Corp. v. Deaton, 1 Misc. 2d 90, 146 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup. Ct.), afj'd, 286 
App. Div. 992, 144 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1955); Gaither v. Charlotte Motor Car Co., 182 N.C. 
498, 109 S.E. 362 (1921); Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 300 (1955). The present discussion does not 
include contracts attempting to fix venue after the cause of action has accrued. For a case 
illustrating the distinction, see Clark v. Lowden, 48 F. Supp. 261 (D. Minn.), appeal dis• 
missed, 135 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1942). 
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reasons for the rule are rooted in a past which seems to evidence ignorance 
of the historical nature and purpose of venue. The rule developed partially 
as a result of certain courts' confusion between venue and jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to try an action;7 jurisdiction 
over the subject-matter is expressly conferred by constitution, statute, or 
treaty, and it may not be conferred by the consent of the parties.s On the 
other hand, venue refers to the locality in which a law suit is tried, and 
the venue statutes, being based on considerations of general convenience 
and expediency,9 are intended for the benefit of the parties as well as for 
that of the courts.10 However, since contract provisions attempting to 
limit jurisdiction are void,U the courts held that contract provisions 
attempting to fix venue in a particular county, to the exclusion of courts in 
another county where venue would be properly laid, were likewise void as 
attempts to oust courts of their jurisdiction.12 However, the courts of the 
latter county would no more be ousted of their jurisdiction by a contractual 
venue provision than they would be if the action were brought in an 
improper county and the defendant, by engaging in litigation, waived his 
right to object to improper venue.13 
Presumably, although the court did not discuss this fact, the defendants 
in the principal case were actually aware of the venue-fixing provision at 
the time the contract was concluded.14 If this was true, then the principal 
case would seem to be distinguishable from the cases on which the general 
rule is based, for only one of those cases involved an agreement in which 
7 Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939); Paige v. Sinclair, 
237 Mass. 482, 130 N.E. 177 (1921). 
8 Industrial Addition Ass'n v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 310, 313 (1944); Neirbo Co. 
v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., supra note 7, at 167; Electrical Prods. Consol. v. Bodell, 
132 Mont. 243, 316 P .2d 788 (1957). For a compilation of state jurisdictional statutes, see 
Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 MICH. L. REv. 307, 317 nn.40 &: 41 
(1951). 
9 Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174 (1856). 
10 Venue relates to the convenience of litigants and consequently is a personal privilege 
which may be waived. Brown v. Alabama Chem. Co., 207 Ala. 215, 92 So. 260 (1922); 
Electrical Prods. Consol. v. Bodell, 132 Mont. 243, 316 P .2d 788 (1957); Neirbo Co. v. 
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168 (1939) (dictum). But see Nute v. Hamilton 
Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 9 (emphasis on convenience of the courts). 
11 See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874); Mutual Reserve 
Fund Life Ass'n v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 82 Fed. 508 (6th Cir. 1897); Nashua River 
Paper Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co., 223 Mass. 8, lll N.E. 678 (1916); Kent v. Universal 
Film Mfg. Corp., 200 App. Div. 539, 193 N.Y. Supp. 838 (1922). 
12 Ziegelmeyer v. Pelphery, 133 Tex. 73, 125 S.W.2d 1083 (1939); International 
Travelers' Ass'n v. Branum, 109 Tex. 543, 212 S.W. 630 (1919); Eaton v. International 
Travelers' Ass'n, 136 S.W. 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911). However, it is not clear what 
the courts mean by the term "void." Generally it is taken to mean that the provision 
may not be specifically enforced; however, the voidness does not necessarily preclude an 
action for damages for breach of the contractual agreement. Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. 
Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174 (1856) (dictum). 
1s Murdock Acceptance Corp. v. Speer, 225 Ark. 948, 286 S.W .2d 485 (1956); Lieffring 
v. Birt, 154 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. App. 1941); Dossey v. Oehler, 359 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1962). 
H Principal case at 360; see note 19 infra. 
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there was actual consent to the venue provision.15 Furthermore, one-half of 
those cases involved contracts which actually sought to oust certain courts of 
their jurisdiction, and all the cases were based on venue provisions in in-
surance contracts.16 While the courts, in applying the general rule, seem to 
make no distinction with reference to the nature of the contract,17 it would 
seem that provisions in insurance contracts should be subjected to policy con-
siderations different from those which govern conditional sale contracts. 
Such factors as the relative bargaining strength of the parties, the length 
of time the venue provision would be effective, and the actual convenience 
to both parties might weigh heavily against allowing such a provision in 
an insurance contract, while the same reasoning might not apply to a 
conditional sale contract. For example, the factor of convenience should be 
given special consideration since, presumably, an insurance company will 
be interested in discouraging litigation against itself, while the seller in a 
conditional sale contract will usually be the party instigating the litigation. 
Consequently, if the venue statutes are primarily based on convenience18-an 
element that can be waived-there should be no reason to prevent a party 
from waiving that convenience at the time the contract is concluded, 
provided the party waiving his venue privilege actually consents.19 
A smaller number of courts which follow the general rule do so on the 
ground that contract provisions fixing venue before the cause of action has 
15 International Travelers' Ass'n v. Branum, 109 Tex. 543, 212 S.W. 630 (1919) 
(contract based on actual consent), the leading authority in Texas, based its holding on 
the following cases: Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874) (agreement 
induced by invalid state statute); Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Cleveland Woolen 
Mills, 82 Fed. 508 (6th Cir. 1897) (actual consent, but contract ousted certain courts of 
jurisdiction); Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174 (1856) (due to 
peculiarities in policy, defendant did not know of provision); Eaton v. International 
Travelers' Ass'n, 136 S.W. -817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) (contract subject to insurance com-
pany by-laws which were changed after the contract was entered into). 
16 Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, supra note 15 (insurance contract-excluded federal courts); 
Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, supra note 15 (insurance 
contract-jurisdiction limited to federal courts); Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., supra 
note 15 (insurance contract-jurisdiction limited to specified county); Eaton v. Inter-
national Travelers' Ass'n, supra note 15 (insurance contract-jurisdiction limited to 
specified county). In International Travelers' Ass'n v. Branum, supra note 15, the agree-
ment ousted no court of its jurisdiction, since it limited jurisdiction only to the courts 
of a certain county (see text accompanying note 13 supra) and the general trial courts of 
the state are exactly the same, regardless of where they are located throughout the state. 
Benson v. Eastern Bldg.&: Loan Ass'n, 174 N.Y. 83, 66 N.E. 627 (1903). 
17 See Detwiler v. Lowden, 198 Minn. 185, 269 N.W. 367 (1936). 
18 See note IO supra. 
19 In Neirbo v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939), the Court held 
that an agreement with a state designating an agent for service of process within the state 
constituted consent to be sued in the federal courts in that state and thereby waived 
objection to the venue. However, in Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953), 
the Court clarified its holding in Neirbo and held that driving on the highways of a 
state having a nonresident -motorist statute, while sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the 
state courts (because jurisdiction in such cases does not rest on consent), did not vest 
jurisdiction in the federal courts in the same state, since "the defendant did not in fact 
consent" to be sued in the federal courts so as to waive his federal venue rights. 
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accrued are violative of applicable venue statutes.20 These courts conclude 
that to allow parties to substitute their will for the will of the legislature 
would tend to negative the statutory venue plan.21 For example, the party 
inserting the venue provision might try to choose counties which, for one 
reason or another, would be most favorable to any litigation he might 
bring on the contract.22 Moreover, even though a defendant may waive his 
objection to venue at trial, the courts will not let him "bind himself in 
advance by an agreement which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit 
his rights at all times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be 
presented."23 Presumably, the courts are trying to protect a party who is 
unaware of the venue-fixing provision, or who is in an unequal bargaining 
position vis-a-vis the party imposing the provision, from being deprived of 
his rights.24 On the other hand, it would appear desirable to allow parties 
a certain amount of latitude and discretion in forming their contracts.25 
In balancing these competing interests, it seems reasonable to allow the 
parties this flexibility in contract formation, yet at the same time to 
subject them to the discretion of the court to transfer or dismiss the action 
on motion if the court concludes that the contractual waiver of venue was 
not a valid consensual agreement arrived at between parties bargaining 
as equals.26 However, the court in the principal case did not discuss these 
considerations, contenting itself instead with reliance on "precedent" 
which perhaps clouds the real issues involved. 
While a minority of courts have reached the opposite result and have 
enforced contracts fixing venue before the cause of action has accrued, 
these courts have done so only with the aid of statutes which provide that 
the parties may seek a change of venue by written stipulation or by 
mutual consent in open court after the cause of action has accrued.27 These 
20 Gardner &: North Roofing &: Siding Corp. v. Deaton, 1 Misc. 2d 90, 146 N.Y.S.2d 
577 (Sup. Ct.), afj'd, 286 App. Div. 992, 114 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1955); Gaither v. Charlotte Motor 
Car Co., 182 N.C. 498, 109 S.E. 362 (1921). 
21 Cases cited note 20 supra. 
22 "Such contracts might be induced by considerations tending to bring the admin-
istration of justice into disrepute; such as the greater or less intelligence and impartiality 
of judges, the greater or less integrity and capacity of juries, the influence, more or less, 
arising from the personal, social or political standing of parties in one or another county." 
Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174, 184 (1856). 
23 Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874). The Texas court quoted this 
in International Travelers' Ass'n v. Branum, 109 Tex. 543, 212 S.W. 630, 632 (1919). 
24 Ibid. 
211 "[C]ourts are less and less disposed to interfere with parties making such [venue-
fixing] contracts as ~ey choose, so long as they interfere with no one's welfare but their 
own." Daley v. People's Bldg., Loan &: Sav. Ass'n, 178 Mass. 13, 59 N.E. 452 (1901); see 6 
UTAH L. REv. 128 (1958). But see 19 MONT. L. REv. 165 (1958). 
26 See State ex rel. Kuhn v. Luchsinger, 231 Wis. 533, 286 N.W. 72 (1939); cf. Gardner 
&: North Roofing &: Siding Corp. v. Deaton, 1 Misc. 2d 90, 146 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup. Ct.),. 
a!fd, 286 App. Div. 992, 144 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1955). 
27 Electrical Prods. Consol. v. Bodell, 132 Mont. 243, 316 P .2d 788 (1957); State ex rer. 
Schwabacher Bros. &: Co. v. Superior Court, 61 Wash. 681, 112 Pac. 927 (1911); State ex. rel. 
Kuhn v. Luchsinger, supra note 26. See also ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-405 (1956);: 
KY. REv. STAT. § 452.010 (1962); s.c. CODE ANN. § 10-305 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-13-9(4) (1953). 
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statutes do not in themselves authorize formation of contracts with pro-
visions fixing venue before the cause of action has accrued, but the courts 
have declared that such statutes evidence an intention on the part of the 
legislature to sanction stipulations as to venue.28 These courts conclude that, 
if the parties may agree after the action is begun that the place of trial 
shall be in any county in the state, it seems only logical to allow them to do 
so before the action is begun.29 
It would seem that the foregoing result is the more sound, and that it 
should be reached whether or not the particular state has a statute which 
permits the parties to agree on a different venue after commencement of 
the action. It recognizes that venue is intended largely for the benefit of 
the defendant, and also that the parties themselves can determine where it 
will be most convenient to bring an action on the contract. If the contract 
provisions are, at the same time, subject to the discretion of the court to 
transfer the action (in effect denying specific performance of the contract 
provision),80 then the convenience of the parties and the courts will be 
best served. 
28 Cases cited note 27 supra. 
29 Ibid. 
so See generally 5 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §§ 1162-71 (1951). 
Robert C. Bonges 
